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5G networks will make network sharing agreements between mobile operators technically possible. However, depending on the
agreed and implemented quality-of-service isolation, the provision of services may lead to unsustainable business cases. In this
paper, the economic feasibility of such arrangements is analyzed for the case of two operators. Concretely, while one network
operator owns the spectrum, one virtual operator does not, and each one provides service to its subscriber base. Two sharing
alternatives, namely, pooling and priority sharing, are studied regarding the profits that each operator gets. We conclude that the
network operator is worse off under any circumstances under a pooling agreement, while a lump sum payment may leave the
network operator better off under a priority sharing agreement.
1. Introduction
Thefifth generation (5G) wireless networks will appear in the
market in 2020 and is expected to improve customers’ quality
of service (QoS) significantly with the increasing of data
volume in mobile networks [1]. Furthermore, 5G networks
will have the capacity to provide different QoS to users with a
wide range of needs, such as new applications, different traffic
types, and a wide range of services [2, 3].
The sharing of any sort of resources among network
operators has been shown as an efficient way of spreading out
the technology at a lower cost.The resources in this paper will
be typically spectrum that is owned by the network operator,
but similar analysis may be performed when the resources
are, e.g., radio-access-network (RAN), network roaming, and
core-network [4, 5]. We will refer to the sharing of resources
with the general termnetwork sharing. Authors of [6] describe
a scenario where infrastructure providers enable the leasing
of resources, which allow service providers to share the cost
of providing coverage with virtual operators, Over-The-Top
providers and industry vertical market players. However,
network sharing is based on the dynamic deployment and
scaling of functions in the 5G networks and requires a careful
orchestration of resources to preserve bilateral agreements
among operators, as stated by [7].
Regarding the costs involved in moving to 5G, they
can be significantly reduced through network densification
and network sharing. The business models analyzing these
scenarios such as [8] are usually focused on the relation be-
tween the service provider and the network operator, where
their physical and logical network infrastructures are tightly
coupled. There are several ways to implement network shar-
ing, as proposed in [9]. A possible new business model could
be based on the sharing of resources, where the owner of
the resources and the operator of the resources are different
actors.
In the literature, some researches are focused on the
study of the economic feasibility of different network sharing
scenarios based on elements of queuing theory, such as [10,
11], as well as microeconomics and game theory concepts [12,
13]. For instance, in the context of network sharing, in [14] the
effects of infrastructure sharing and competition regulation
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on cellular network planning are analyzed. The authors of
[15] analyze a network slicing scenario, based on game theory
and a framework called “share-constrained proportional allo-
cation”; the results obtained provide an effective and imple-
mentable scheme for dynamically sharing resources across
slices. In [16], the authors investigate the generic instruments
for addressing a spectrum sharing in 4G networks from a
cooperative games perspective and conclude that, in most
of the considered instances, the mobile network operators
(MNOs) are better off building a unique shared RAN than
creating subcoalitions or building individual RANs due to the
combined gain from spectrum aggregation and cost reduc-
tion from sharing the network infrastructure. In [17], the
authors investigate a particular class of congestion games and
learning mechanisms to design a distributed solution to the
wireless network slicing problem. In the same way, there are
some studies that analyze the network sharing, based on game
theory, such as [18–21]. In the framework of the queue theory,
in [22] the effects of queueing delays and users’ related costs
on the management and control computing resources are
analyzed. The authors of [23] propose an analysis from a
pricing perspective, based on priority queuing (PQ) and
Generalized Processor Sharing, with the issue of maximizing
networks operators revenue. In [24], the authors investigate
the priority queuing as a way to establish service differentia-
tion; to do that, they consider the Discriminatory Processor
Sharing discipline for two models of service with different
QoS and determine the prices that maximize the provider’s
profit. In the same way, [25] studies pricing for heterogeneous
services based on a priority queuing as a way to establish ser-
vice differentiation. Additionally, in [26] the authors analyze
the cooperation strategies among mobile network operators
competitors, customers, and different types of partners based
on network sharing. However, the mentioned studies do
not analyze the incentives to mobile operators to engage in
spectrum sharing schemes using priority sharing disciplines
in a network sharing environment from an economic point of
view.
Our aim in this paper is to proceed one step further and
model the strategic interaction in network sharing between a
network operator and a virtual operator, providing service to
their users. We analyze two alternatives: pooling and priority
sharing. The analysis is conducted by means of game theory.
Our main contribution is to prove that network sharing
is economically viable and allows the network and virtual
operators to coexist under a priority sharing agreement.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
we describe in detail the model with the actors, the utility of
each actor, and the pricing scheme. In Section 3, we analyze
and solve the subscription and pricing strategies of the differ-
ent models. In Section 4, we show and discuss the results.
Finally, in Section 5, we present the conclusions.
2. Model Description
2.1. General Model. This section models the following two
sharing agreements:
(i) Pooling: the operators share equally the resource.
(ii) Priority sharing: the operators share the resource
under different priorities.
In addition, we analyze in the Appendix the case where
there is only one operator providing service; i.e., no priority is
implemented and the operator behaves as a monopolist. This
case will be used as a baseline for comparison in Section 4. A
summary of the notation used in this paper is given in Table 1.
The network operator (aka. Operator 1) is the spectrum
owner, while the virtual operator (aka. Operator 2) leases the
resource under the specific sharing agreement. As part of the
sharing agreement, the operator undertakes to communicate
the data of the number of users to the other operator. We
assume that each operator has its own subscriber base.
The network, i.e., the spectrum resource that is used for
providing service, is modeled as an M/M/1/∞ queue, where
packets are generated by the subscribers of the two opera-
tors and are served according to the scheduling discipline
described below. Operator 𝑖 has 𝑛𝑖 subscribers that indepen-
dently generate packets following a Poisson process with a
rate 𝜆𝑑, so that for each operator we can define a Poisson
packet arrival process with rate 𝜆𝑖 = 𝜆𝑑𝑛𝑖, and the sum of the
twoprocesses is also Poissonwith rate𝜆 = 𝜆1+𝜆2.The service
times of all packets are exponentially distributed with mean1/𝜇. We assume for stability reasons that 𝜆 < 𝜇.
Under the pooling agreement, the scheduling discipline
is First-Come-First-Served and there is no priority.Themean
packet system time 𝑇𝑖 can be computed as
𝑇1 = 𝑇2 = ( 1𝜇 − (𝑛1 + 𝑛2) 𝜆𝑑) . (1)
Under the priority sharing agreement, we propose that
the service provided by the network be modeled by a
Discriminatory Processor Sharing (DPS) discipline, where
each customer has a relative priority and receives service at an
instantaneous rate proportional to the priority [11, 27, 28]. A
DPS queue basically works as follows: if there are 𝑛 customers
with priorities 𝑥1, 𝑥2, . . . , 𝑥𝑛 (𝑥𝑖 ≤ 1 for 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑛), then the
customer 𝑖 is served at a fraction 𝑥𝑖/∑𝑛𝑗=1 𝑥𝑗 of the servers
capacity [11]. In our analysis we use a DPS model with two
relative priorities: 𝑥1 = 1 − 𝛾 for the network operator and𝑥2 = 𝛾 for the virtual operator, where 𝑥1 + 𝑥2 = 1 and0 ≤ 𝛾 ≤ 1. DPS is a mechanism much more flexible than
priority queuing in order to model the sharing of a common
resource, thanks to the 𝛾 parameter. 𝑇𝑖 can be computed [11]
as
𝑇1
= 1𝜇 − 𝜆𝑑𝑛1 − 𝜆𝑑𝑛2 (1 + 𝜆𝑑𝑛2 (2𝛾 − 1)𝜇 − (1 − 𝛾) 𝜆𝑑𝑛1 − 𝛾𝜆𝑑𝑛2) ,
(2)
𝑇2
= 1𝜇 − 𝜆𝑑𝑛1 − 𝜆𝑑𝑛2 (1 − 𝜆𝑑𝑛1 (2𝛾 − 1)𝜇 − (1 − 𝛾) 𝜆𝑑𝑛1 − 𝛾𝜆𝑑𝑛2) .
(3)
Note that Preemptive Resume PQ, if the users were
serviced in a processor sharing manner, is a special case of
DPS discipline, since 𝛾 = 0 gives strict priority to operator 1
users while 𝛾 = 1would give strict priority to operator 2 users
[24].
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Table 1: Summary of notations.
Eq.
General Model
Mean packet system time 𝑇𝑖 (1)
Mean service rate 𝜇 (1)
Subscribers mean arrival rate 𝜆𝑑 (1)
Operator 1’s number of users 𝑛1 (1)
Operator 2’s number of users 𝑛2 (1)
Virtual Operator’s relative priority 𝛾 (2)
Quality perceived by the users 𝑄𝑖 (4)
Users sensitivity to delay 𝛼 (4)
Conversion factor 𝑐 (4)
Users utility 𝑈𝑖 (5)
Price charged by operator 𝑖 𝑝𝑖 (5)
Operator i’s profits Π𝑖 (6)
GameModel
Operator 1’s best response 𝐵𝑅1 (11)
Operator 2’s best response 𝐵𝑅2 (12)
Operator 1’s equilibrium price 𝑝∗1 (13)
Operator 2’s equilibrium price 𝑝∗2 (14)
Operator 1’s equilibrium number of users 𝑛∗1 (16)
Operator 2’s equilibrium number of users 𝑛∗2 (16)
Arbitrarily small positive value 𝜖
Boundary cases I-II 𝑝1𝛾 (34)
Boundary cases I-II 𝑝2𝛾 (35)
Boundary cases III-IV 𝑝1𝑈 (36)
Boundary cases II-IV 𝑝2𝑈 (37)
TheAppendix- Monopoly
Monopolistic operator’s profits Π0 (A.1)
Monopolistic operator’s number of users 𝑛0 (A.1)
Price charged by monopolistic operator 𝑝0 (A.1)
Users Utility 𝑈0 (A.3)
Monopolistic operator’s optimal price 𝑝∗0 (A.9)
We quantify the quality perceived by the users of each
operator borrowing a variation of the expression used in
[23, 25, 29, 30]. In order to analyze the impact of the priority
parameter 𝛾, we assume that the users are homogeneous in
their service time requirements for both operators.
𝑄𝑖 ≡ 𝑐𝑇−𝛼𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1, 2, (4)
where 𝑐 > 0 is a conversion factor and 𝑇𝑖 has been de-
fined and computed above. We define 0 ≤ 𝛼 ≤ 1 as the user
sensitivity to delay, since a greater 𝛼 translates into a worse
perceived quality, for a given delay. The user utility is
proposed to be given by the difference between the quality
perceived by the users in monetary units minus the price
charged by the operator. Specifically, the user utility we
model has the advantage of being interpretable in monetary-
equivalent terms: since 𝑐𝑇𝛼𝑖 is the value that the outcome has
to user 𝑖 and 𝑝𝑖 (inmonetary units per second (m.u./s.)) is the
price that the user pays,𝑈𝑖 can be seen as the benefit (m.u./s.)
of user 𝑖. 𝑈𝑖 ≡ 𝑐𝑇−𝛼𝑖 − 𝑝𝑖, 𝑖 = 1, 2. (5)
We set the utility when users do not subscribe to the
service to zero.
Note that a similar approach for modeling the user utility
can be found at, e.g., [22, 31–33]. And this form of utility
function can be related to the quasi-linear function widely
used in microeconomic and telecommunications networks
analysis as described in [34].
The network operator charges a price𝑝1 to its users, while
the virtual operator charges a price 𝑝2. We assume that no
costs are incurred by the operators.The operators’ profits will
then be given byΠ𝑖 = 𝜆𝑑𝑛𝑖 (𝑝𝑖) 𝑝𝑖, 𝑖 = 1, 2. (6)
Remark that the profits functions described in (6) should
have been decreased by the operator’s costs. Important
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components of these costs are the operating costs and the
investment costs. We do not consider the operating costs, as
their inclusion does not provide additional insight since they
do not depend on the price of the service, while it makes the
expression of profits less explicit. Related to the investment
costs, we can consider themconstant, given that the time scale
on which the provider can adapt his network capacity 𝜇 is
relatively long compared to the time scale on which prices
vary [25, 30].
2.2. GameModel. From the above model description, we can
observe the following strategic interactions:
(i) Flow i’s subscription decision is influenced by opera-
tor i’s pricing decision.
(ii) Operator i’s profit depends on flow i’s subscription
decision.
(iii) Flow i’s subscription decision depends on flow j’sdeci-
sion with (𝑗 ̸= 𝑖), through the 𝑄𝑖 factor.
(iv) Operator i’s profit is then influenced by operator j’s
pricing decision, indirectly through flow j’s subscrip-
tion decision.
We conclude then that the above strategic scenario is
amenable to game theory. Specifically, each operator will
choose its pricing strategy 𝑝𝑖 aiming at maximizing its profitΠ𝑖.
We will use a two-stage sequential game of the multi-
leader follower kind, where, in the first stage, each operator
chooses a price𝑝𝑖 in order tomaximize its profitΠ𝑖.The game
is solved using backward induction [35], which means that at
Stage I players proceed strategically anticipating the solution
of Stage II.
In the second stage, for each operator, the following
applies. Each user takes its own subscription decision, trying
to maximize the utility it gets from either subscribing to the
operator or not. The user will observe the price published by
the operator andwill take the decision of service subscription.
Assuming that number of users is high enough, the individual
subscription decision of one user does not affect the utility of
the rest of the users. Under these conditions, the equilibrium
reached is that postulated by Wardrop [36]. Applying this
notion of equilibrium, known asWardrop equilibrium, to the
user subscription problem, we postulate that
(i) either 𝑛𝑖 ≥ 0 and 𝑈𝑖 = 0
(ii) or 𝑛𝑖 = 0 and 𝑈𝑖 < 0.
Combining the above alternatives, we can identify four out-
comes:
(i) Case I:
𝑈1 = 0,
𝑈2 = 0
and 𝑛1 ≥ 0,
𝑛2 ≥ 0
(7)
(ii) Case II:
𝑈1 = 0,
𝑈2 < 0
and 𝑛1 ≥ 0,
𝑛2 = 0
(8)
(iii) Case III:
𝑈1 < 0,
𝑈2 = 0
and 𝑛1 = 0,
𝑛2 ≥ 0
(9)
(iv) Case IV:
𝑈1 < 0,
𝑈2 < 0
and 𝑛1 = 0,
𝑛2 = 0
(10)
In the first stage, each operator chooses a price in order
to maximize its profits in a simultaneous and independent
way. Each operator is not only aware of the users subscription
decision in the second stage, but also of the rational behavior
of the other operator. Under such circumstances, the equilib-
rium reached is the Nash equilibrium [37], where no player
has an incentive to change its own strategy unilaterally.
The general method to discover the set of Nash equilibria
is to obtain the best-response (BR) function of each operator
and identify the crossing points [34]. The BR functions are
defined as follows:𝐵𝑅1 (𝑝2) = argmax𝑝1 Π1 (𝑝1, 𝑝2) , (11)
𝐵𝑅2 (𝑝1) = argmax𝑝2 Π2 (𝑝1, 𝑝2) . (12)
Once we have obtained the BR functions, we can obtain
the set ofNash equilibria solving the following systemof equa-
tions: 𝑝∗1 = argmax𝑝1 Π1 (𝑝1, 𝑝∗2 ) , (13)
𝑝∗2 = argmax𝑝2 Π2 (𝑝∗1 , 𝑝2) . (14)
3. Models Analysis
In this section, we analyze the models described in Section 2.
3.1. Pooling. In this subsection, operator 1 and operator 2 are
sharing the spectrum resource.The utility of the users can be
obtained replacing (1) in (5).
𝑈𝑖 = 𝑐 ⋅ (𝜇 − (𝑛1 + 𝑛2) ⋅ 𝜆𝑑)𝛼 − 𝑝𝑖 𝑖 = 1, 2 (15)
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We obtain the equilibrium values for 𝑛1 and 𝑛2, given 𝑝1
and 𝑝2, as follows.
(i) Case I: from (7) and (15) we obtain
𝑛∗1 + 𝑛∗2 = [𝜇 − (𝑝1/𝑐)
1/𝛼]
𝜆𝑑 =
[𝜇 − (𝑝2/𝑐)1/𝛼]𝜆𝑑 , (16)
which is only feasible if 𝑝1 = 𝑝2. Without loss of
generality, we can assume that 𝑛∗1 = 𝑛∗2 , so that
𝑛∗1 = [𝜇 − (𝑝1/𝑐)
1/𝛼]
2𝜆𝑑 , (17)
𝑛∗2 = [𝜇 − (𝑝2/𝑐)
1/𝛼]
2𝜆𝑑 . (18)
(ii) Case II: from (8) and (15) we obtain
𝑛∗1 = [𝜇 − (𝑝1/𝑐)
1/𝛼]
𝜆𝑑 , (19)
𝑛∗2 = 0, (20)
𝑝1 ≤ 𝑐𝑢𝛼. (21)
𝑝2 > 𝑝1. (22)
(iii) Case III: from (9) and (15) we obtain
𝑛∗1 = 0, (23)
𝑛∗2 = [𝜇 − (𝑝2/𝑐)
1/𝛼]
𝜆𝑑 , (24)
𝑝2 ≤ 𝑐𝑢𝛼, (25)
𝑝1 > 𝑝2. (26)
(iv) Case IV: finally, from (10) and (15)
𝑛∗1 = 0 (27)
𝑛∗2 = 0, (28)
𝑝1 > 𝑐𝜇𝛼, (29)
𝑝2 > 𝑐𝜇𝛼. (30)
As a corollary, price values for Case I comply with 𝑝1 ≤𝑐𝜇𝛼.
Table 2 summarizes the results of the users’ subscription
decision under a pooling agreement. Figure 1 shows a graph-
ical representation of the regions for a specific configuration
of the parameters.
Case I
Case II
Case III
Case IV
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2
1.2
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
Ｊ
2
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.Ｏ
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Ｍ.
)
Ｊ1 (Ｇ.Ｏ./Ｍ.)
Figure 1: Wardrop equilibrium regions for pooling with 𝑐 = 1, 𝛼 =0.8, 𝜇 = 1 packets per second (p/s), 𝜆𝑑 = 0.5 p/s.
At this point we proceed to analyze the equilibrium prices𝑝∗𝑖 , given the values for 𝑛∗1 and 𝑛∗2 . For this purposewe use (6)
and we obtain the BRs as defined by (11) and (12):
𝐵𝑅1 (𝑝2) =
{{{{{{{{{{{{{
𝑝1 ≥ 0 if 𝑝2 = 0
𝑝2 − 𝜖 if 0 < 𝑝2 ≤ 𝑝∗0
𝑐𝜇𝛼 ( 𝛼1 + 𝛼)
𝛼
if 𝑝2 > 𝑝∗0
𝐵𝑅2 (𝑝1) =
{{{{{{{{{{{{{
𝑝2 ≥ 0 if 𝑝1 = 0
𝑝1 − 𝜖 if 0 < 𝑝1 ≤ 𝑝∗0
𝑐𝜇𝛼 ( 𝛼1 + 𝛼)
𝛼
if 𝑝1 > 𝑝∗0
(31)
where 𝑝∗0 is the profit maximizing price for a monopolistic
operator, which is given by (A.9), and 𝜖 is an arbitrarily small
positive value.TheNash equilibrium is the intersection of the
BRs, which is easily derived as 𝑝∗1 = 0 and 𝑝∗2 = 0, with zero
profits Π∗1 = 0,Π∗2 = 0. We conclude that a pooling agree-
ment between a network operator and a virtual operator
generates strategic interaction that drives prices and profits
to zero.
3.2. Priority Sharing. In this section, we analyze the case
where operator 1 and operator 2 share the spectrum resource
according to a distribution of relative priority. As justified in
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Table 2: Users subscription decision-pooling.
Case 𝑛∗1 𝑛∗2 𝑝1 𝑝2
I
[𝜇 − (𝑝1/𝑐)1/𝛼]2𝜆𝑑 [𝜇 − (𝑝2/𝑐)
1/𝛼]2𝜆𝑑 𝑝1 ≤ 𝑐𝑢𝛼 𝑝2 = 𝑝1
II
[𝜇 − (𝑝1/𝑐)1/𝛼]𝜆𝑑 0 0 ≤ 𝑝1 ≤ 𝑐𝜇𝛼 𝑝2 > 𝑝1
III 0
[𝜇 − (𝑝2/𝑐)1/𝛼]𝜆𝑑 𝑝1 > 𝑝2 0 ≤ 𝑝2 ≤ 𝑐𝜇𝛼
IV 0 0 𝑝1 > 𝑐𝜇𝛼 𝑝2 > 𝑐𝜇𝛼
Section 2.1, this distribution is modeled bymeans of DPS and𝑇𝑖 are now given by (2) and (3), so that the user utility will be
𝑈1
= 𝑐( 𝜇 + (𝛾 − 1) (𝜆𝑑𝑛1 + 𝜆𝑑𝑛2)(𝜇 − 𝜆𝑑𝑛1 − 𝜆𝑑𝑛2) (𝜇 − 𝛾𝜆𝑑𝑛2 + (𝛾 − 1) 𝜆𝑑𝑛1))
−𝛼
− 𝑝1,
(32)
𝑈2
= 𝑐( 𝜇 − 𝛾 (𝜆𝑑𝑛1 + 𝜆𝑑𝑛2)(𝜇 − 𝜆𝑑𝑛1 − 𝜆𝑑𝑛2) (𝜇 − 𝛾𝜆𝑑𝑛2 + (𝛾 − 1) 𝜆𝑑𝑛1))
−𝛼
− 𝑝2.
(33)
Following a similar reasoning as in Section 3.1, we obtain
the equilibrium values for 𝑛∗1 and 𝑛∗2 and the constraints on𝑝1
and𝑝2, which are shown inTable 3. Figure 2 shows a graphical
representation of the cases for a specific configuration of the
parameters.
The following expressions for the cases boundaries apply:
𝑝1𝛾 = 𝑐( 𝛾𝜇 (𝑝2/𝑐)−1/𝛼 − 𝛾 + 1−𝛾𝜇 + 𝛾 (𝑝2/𝑐)1/𝛼 + 𝜇)
−𝛼 , (34)
𝑝2𝛾 = 𝑐((𝑝1/𝑐)
−1/𝛼 ((𝛾 − 1) 𝜇 − 𝛾 (𝑝1/𝑐)1/𝛼)
(𝛾 − 1) (𝑝1/𝑐)1/𝛼 − 𝛾𝜇 )
−𝛼
, (35)
𝑝1𝑈 = 𝑐𝜇𝛼, (36)
𝑝2𝑈 = 𝑐𝜇𝛼. (37)
Note that when 𝛾 = 1/2, the priority sharing agreement
reduces to the pooling agreement, since FCFS and DPS result
in the same value for 𝑇𝑖.
Unlike Section 3.1, we have proceeded numerically in the
analysis of Stage I, as regards the BRs and the Nash equili-
brium.
4. Results and Discussion
In this section, numerical values are computed for the users,
prices, and profits for the network and virtual operators under
a priority sharing agreement. Note that the prices and the
profits are zero for pooling, as concluded in Section 3.1.
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2
1.2
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
Case I
Case II
Case III
Case IV
Ｊ
2
(Ｇ
.Ｏ
./
Ｍ.
)
Ｊ1 (Ｇ.Ｏ./Ｍ.)
Figure 2:Wardrop equilibrium regions for priority sharing with 𝛾 =1/10, 𝑐 = 1, 𝛼 = 0.8, 𝜇 = 1 packets per second (p/s), 𝜆𝑑 = 0.5 p/s.
We set the parameters 𝛼 = {0.5, 0.8, 1}, 𝑐 = 1, 𝜇 = 1
packet/s, 𝜆𝑑 = 0.01 packet/s and we vary 𝛾 ∈ [0, 1]. Figures
3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 show the prices, the number of users, and
profits, respectively. The values 𝑝∗0 , 𝑛∗0 , and Π∗0 refer to the
monopoly (the Appendix), while the values 𝑝∗1 , 𝑛∗1 , and Π∗1
refer to the network operator, and the values 𝑝∗2 , 𝑛∗2 , and Π∗2
refer to the virtual operator.
Figure 3 shows the effect of 𝛼 and 𝛾 (the virtual operator’s
relative priority) on the equilibrium prices of the monopolis-
tic operator and operator 1. The price 𝑝1 decreases as 𝛼 and 𝛾
increase, since the QoS and priority (1− 𝛾) of the service that
the network operator can provide to its subscribers are lower.
However, when 𝛾 approaches 1 the price 𝑝1 increases. In this
situation the network operator is giving strict priority to the
virtual operator; i.e., the DPS discipline behaves as a PQ.
This specific setting is analyzed in [24, 29, 30] and the results
match those shown in Figure 3. The monopolistic price 𝑝∗0 is
a constant value because it does not depend on 𝛾 (Table 4).
When 𝛾 ∈ ]0, 1[, 𝑝∗0 is greater than the equilibrium prices,
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Table 3: Users subscription decision-priority sharing.
Case 𝑛∗1 𝑛∗2 𝑝1 𝑝2
I (𝛾 ̸= 1/2)
1𝜆𝑑 1(𝛾 − 1) (𝑐/𝑝1)1/𝛼 + 𝛾 (𝑐/𝑝2)1/𝛼− 1𝜆𝑑 𝜇𝛾 (𝑐/𝑝2)−1/𝛼 (𝑐/𝑝1)1/𝛼 + 𝛾 − 1
1𝜆𝑑 𝜇(𝛾 − 1) (𝑐/𝑝2)1/𝛼 (𝑐/𝑝1)−1/𝛼 + 𝛾− 1𝜆𝑑 1(𝛾 − 1) (𝑐/𝑝1)1/𝛼 + 𝛾 (𝑐/𝑝2)1/𝛼
𝑝1 ≤ 𝑝1𝛾 𝑝2 ≤ 𝑝2𝛾
I (𝛾 = 1/2) [𝜇 − (𝑝1/𝑐)1/𝛼]2𝜆𝑑
[𝜇 − (𝑝2/𝑐)1/𝛼]2𝜆𝑑 𝑝1 ≤ 𝑝1𝛾 𝑝2 = 𝑝1
II [𝜇 − (𝑝1𝑐 )
1/𝛼] ( 1𝜆𝑑 ) 0 0 ≤ 𝑝1 ≤ 𝑝1𝑈 𝑝2 > 𝑝2𝛾
III 0 [𝜇 − (𝑝2𝑐 )
1/𝛼]( 1𝜆𝑑 ) 𝑝1 > 𝑝1𝛾 0 ≤ 𝑝2 ≤ 𝑝2𝑈
IV 0 0 𝑝1 > 𝑝1𝑈 𝑝2 > 𝑝2𝑈
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Figure 3: Prices of users for the network operator and the monop-
olistic operator as a function of 𝛾 for different values of 𝛼.
whereas𝑝∗𝑖 = 𝑝∗0 when operator 𝑖 is given strict priority, since
it receives a preemptive priority service; i.e., it is not affected
by the nonpriority users.
Figure 4 shows the effect of 𝛼 and 𝛾 on the equilibrium
prices of operator 2. The prices (𝑝1, 𝑝2) behavior is symmet-
rical; i.e., 𝑝2 exhibits the same behavior as the one described
above but when 𝛼 increases and 𝛾 decreases from 1 to 0.
We can conclude that the entry of the virtual operator
causes the price charged both by the network operator and
by the virtual operator to decrease; therefore, it is beneficial
for the users. And we have numerically investigated that PQ
is the limit case of DPS always providing the highest prices.
Figure 5 shows the effect of 𝛼 and 𝛾 on the number of
users of operator 1. 𝑛1 increases when 𝛼 increases from 0 to 1
and 𝛾 increases from 0 to 0.5, which can be explained by the
decrease in price 𝑝1. At the same time, operator 2 loses all its
users, and 𝑛2 gets to zero. When 𝛾 = 0.5, the system behaves
as in the pooling agreement, i.e., zero prices and equal level of
subscription. When 𝛾 increases from 0.5 to 1, the number of
users switches and operator 1 loses its users. Figure 6 shows
the effect of 𝛼 and 𝛾 on the number of users of operator 2.The
behavior of 𝑛2 and 𝑛1 is symmetrical; i.e., 𝑛2 exhibits the same
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Figure 4: Prices of users of the virtual operator as a function of 𝛾
for different values of 𝛼.
behavior as the one described above but when 𝛼 increases
from 0 to 1 and 𝛾 decreases from 1 to 0.
The results show that the operator with the higher priority
(e.g., operator 1 in the left hand side of Figure 5) is able to
provide a satisfactory service to amaximum number of users,
although the equilibrium price needs to be very low but non-
null (Figure 3). For 𝛾 near the values of 0 and 1, the number
of users that the operator with the higher priority can serve is
lower than the maximum; however, the equilibrium price is
not so low as before, and the profits are greater (Figure 7).This
specific setting is analyzed in [24, 29, 30], where the discipline
was Preemptive Resume Priority Queueing (which, if users
are served in a processor-sharing manner, is equivalent to
DPS for 𝛾 = 0 or 1).The explanation for these results is related
to the fact that only when 𝛾 is near 0 or 1, the QoS received
by each user group is sufficiently different from each other
so that the competition between the two operators is not too
fierce and the prices need not be too low.
Figure 7 shows the equilibrium profit of each operator as𝛼 and 𝛾 vary. We observe that the network operator suffers a
significant reduction in its profitΠ1 when𝛼 and 𝛾 increase be-
tween 0 < 𝛾 < 1. The profits only recover when 𝛾 approaches
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Table 4: Users, prices, and profit of one operator case.
Case 𝑛∗0 𝑝∗0 Π∗0 (𝑝0)
I [𝜇 − (𝑝𝑜𝑐 )
1/𝛼] ( 1𝜆0 ) 𝑝∗0 = 𝑐𝜇𝛼 ( 𝛼1 + 𝛼)
𝛼 Π0(𝑝∗0 ) = 𝑐𝜇𝛼+1 ( 𝛼1 + 𝛼)
𝛼+1 ( 1𝛼)
II 0 𝑝0 > 𝑐𝜇𝛼 Π0(𝑝∗0 ) = 0
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Figure 5: Number of users for the network operator and the mono-
polistic operator as a function of 𝛾 for different values of 𝛼.
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Figure 6: Number of users for the virtual operator as a function of𝛾 for different values of 𝛼.
0 or 1; i.e., the DPS discipline behaves as a PQ. The behavior
described is consistent with the combined behavior of the
prices and the number of users, described above. The virtual
operator behavior is symmetrical; i.e., Π2 exibits the same
behavior as the one described above but when𝛼 increases and𝛾 decreases from 1 to 0.
When compared to the profit that the network operator
would get in a monopoly, Π0 (the Appendix), we conclude
that the network operator is always worse off under a priority
sharing agreement. Obviously, it is also worse off under a
pooling agreement. However, we can determine a lump sum
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Figure 7: Profits for the network operator and the virtual operator
as a function of 𝛾 for different values of 𝛼.
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Figure 8: Π∗1 + Π∗2 and profits for the monopolistic operator as a
function of 𝛾 for different values of 𝛼.
payment 𝑚 that the virtual operator would make to the
network operator in order to provide an incentive to the latter.
Indeed, this payment should not only improve the situation
of the network operator, that is, Π1 + 𝑚 ≥ Π0, but also allow
the virtual operator to obtain nonnegative profitsΠ2−𝑚 ≥ 0.
Joining the two conditions we obtain Π0 − Π1 ≤ 𝑚 ≤ Π2.
Thus, a necessary condition for the existence of a possible
payment is Π1 + Π2 ≥ Π0. This condition obviously does
not hold for the pooling agreement. As regards the priority
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sharing agreement, Figure 8 shows that this condition holds
only for sufficiently small values of 𝛾 or 1 − 𝛾.
We can conclude that network sharing is incentive com-
patible under the following conditions: first, that a priority
sharing agreement is reached and second, that either a very
low or a very high relative priority is granted to the virtual
operator willing to access the network operator resources.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we have evaluated the issue of network sharing
between a network operator and a virtual operator for profit-
maximization purposes. We have studied the economic
viability of the sharing under pooling and priority sharing
agreements, and these are compared with a monopoly. Our
main results suggest that the network operator is worse off
under any circumstances under a pooling agreement. The
entry of a virtual operator is desirable from the point of
view of the users’ prices. Additionally, for each parameter
configuration there exist a range of values of 𝛾, for which
a lump sum payment can be designed so that the network
operator has an incentive to let the virtual operator enter.
Appendix
Monopoly
In this appendix, we study the case where only the net-
work operator provides the service to users. The first stage
described in Section 2.2 is reduced to an optimal decision
by the network operator in order to maximize its profits
(A.1),whereas the second stage is reduced to two cases.
Π0 = 𝜆0𝑛0𝑝0 (A.1)
The utility in this case is
𝑈0 = 𝑐𝑇−𝛼0 − 𝑝0 (A.2)
where 𝑇0 = (1/(𝜇 − 𝑛0𝜆0)), and replacing 𝑇0 in (A.2), we
obtain
𝑈0 = 𝑐 (𝜇 − 𝑛0𝜆0)𝛼 − 𝑝0 (A.3)
Analyzing the users’ subscription decision we observe
that given a price 𝑝0 announced by the operator, theWardrop
equilibrium will be as follows.
(i) Case I: the number of users subscribing increases
until the utility is zero. Therefore, the condition for
this case is
𝑈0 = 0 (A.4)
Solving (A.3) under condition (A.4), the number of
users is then
𝑛0 = [𝜇 − (𝑝𝑜𝑐 )
1/𝛼]( 1𝜆0) (A.5)
(ii) Case II: the price in (A.3) is so high that the utility is
always negative. Therefore the condition for this case
is
𝑈0 < 0 (A.6)
Under condition (A.6), the users do not subscribe the
service. Therefore, the number of users is
𝑛0 = 0 (A.7)
Assuming equilibrium is Case I, we can obtain the
profits replacing (A.5) in (A.1).
Π0 = [𝜇 − (𝑝0𝑐 )
1/𝛼]𝑝0 (A.8)
We can maximize the profit setting its derivative with
respect to the price (𝑝0) equal to zero; the result of (𝑝∗0 ) is
𝑝∗0 = 𝑐𝜇𝛼 ( 𝛼1 + 𝛼)
𝛼
(A.9)
Finally we can obtain the maximum profit replacing (A.9)
in (A.1).
Π0 (𝑝∗0 ) = 𝑐𝜇𝛼+1 ( 𝛼1 + 𝛼)
𝛼+1 ( 1𝛼) (A.10)
Table 4 shows the results of the prices and profit for this
case.
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